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In Hall v. City of Santa Barbara' the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals left open the possibility that a mobile home rent control ordinance
could be a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 2
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in another mobile home rent
control case, Yee v. City of Escondido,3 it seems appropriate to take stock
of the current state of the economic and legal issues surrounding the con-
stitutionality of rent control. William Fischel has helped us in that effort
by providing a challenging and provocative analysis of the takings - rent
control issue.
Professor Fischel's analysis centers on the particulars of Judge
Kozinski's Ninth Circuit opinion in Hall. In this commentary I will sug-
gest that Fischel's focus on the Kozinski opinion gives a somewhat mis-
leading characterization of where takings law currently stands. In
addition, I will briefly suggest some important normative considerations
that ought to be included in the takings debate.
Mobile home rent control can be distinguished from traditional rent
control on a number of dimensions. First and foremost, most mobile
home coaches are owned by the occupants. Because occupants move
while coaches do not, one would expect a substantial portion of the bene-
fits of rent control to be capitalized into the value of the coaches. Sec-
ond, the amount of land that is made available for mobile home parks is
often highly restricted by local zoning ordinances (in part because mobile
homes are often limited to mobile home parks, and in part because com-
munities are often reluctant to allow such parks within their boundaries.)
To the extent that these restrictions are binding, the grant of the right to
develop a mobile home park may amount to be the grant of the right to
* The author is Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, and Chair of the Program in Law
and Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. The helpful comments of Vicki Been,
William Fischel, and Andrea Peterson are greatly appreciated.
1. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 940 (1988).
2. Specifically, the Appellate Court ruled that a challenge to the rent control ordinance should
not have been dismissed on the basis of the pleadings alone. The Supreme Court did not grant
certiorari in the case.
3. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
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earn a monopoly rent.
4
The first dimension helps to explain why mobile home rent control
is likely to be less inefficient than other forms of rent control. One of the
inefficiencies often associated with rent control is the tendency of owners
of controlled units to underinvest in maintenance-without correspond-
ing rent increases, there is no financial return to maintenance investment.
In the mobile home rent control situation, if the tenants-who rent the
land, but who own the coaches at the time of imposition of rent con-
trol-profit extensively, while future owners gain very little (they pay
lower rents but a higher purchase price for the coach), current owners of
mobile home coaches will have an incentive to invest in maintenance.5
Consequently, there is likely to be little undermaintenance.
The second dimension may also be important from a policy perspec-
tive. Monopoly rents are an indication of an excess demand for or a
shortage of supply of mobile home sites. If this supply shortage is a long-
run phenomena, it can conflict with the nation's overall housing supply
goals.
6
In his opinion in Hall,7 Judge Kozinski chooses to oppose mobile
home rent control even though it is apparently relatively efficient, while
traditional rent control is highly inefficient. According to Professor Fis-
chel, this perspective is paradoxical, since it is an apparent contradiction
to the plausible view that the more inefficient the regulation the more
likely that it should be opposed.
Whether the Kozinski comment, which appears in footnote twenty-
four of the Hall opinion, accurately reflects Judge Kozinski's underlying
views about rent control is not particularly at issue. However, it does
raise an important larger question-what relationship, if any, should the
inefficiency of a regulation bear to the decision as to whether a regulatory
taking has occurred?
From a purely positive legal perspective there is no contradiction in
the distinction that Judge Kozinski made.8 Moreover, were I given the
4. Occasionally, the monopoly rights can be granted in direct exchange for rent control.
Thus, in Stuyvesant Town Corp. v. Impellitteri, 114 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term), aff'd, 117
N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 1952), Metropolitan Life Insurance Company received the right of eminent
domain to erect apartments in return for rent control.
5. Future owners do benefit under rent control by being insured against unusual and arbitrary
rent increases. The insurance perspective is discussed later in this note.
6. But see Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a
Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399 (1988), for
some evidence to the contrary.
7. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 940 (1988).
8. Professor Fischel would himself characterize a paradox as an apparent contradiction that
is, on closer examination, not a contradiction at all.
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opportunity to distinguish mobile home rent control from other forms of
rent control on a normative basis, I would base my distinction on entirely
different arguments.
NORMATIVE CONCERNS
First, the normative perspective. I believe that any local ordinance,
including rent control, ought to pass a substantive rational basis test:
Does mobile home rent control as enacted meet or make a serious effort
to meet the stated objectives of the local ordinance? In other words, is
mobile home rent control an appropriate use of the police power? Thus,
to the extent that the purpose of mobile home rent control is to provide
affordable rents to current and future tenants, I would conclude that
such controls are not constitutional. Current tenants are clearly helped,
but if there is complete capitalization, future tenants receive little if any
benefit.9
This rational basis test allows one to distinguish traditional rent con-
trol from mobile home rent control. Because it is illegal to charge "key
money" or to use other means of appropriating the benefits of rent con-
trol, and because supply is relatively elastic in the long run, some of the
benefits of traditional rent control are likely to flow to future as well as
current tenants. This allows the jurisdiction passing a rent control ordi-
nance to make a colorable claim that rent control has been administered
so as to be consistent with the stated goals of the program-that of
achieving affordable rents for all tenants.10
Two issues become central under this approach: (1) To what extent
is the regulation likely to be fully capitalized? More generally, to what
extent are the benefits of the regulation likely to accrue to future as well
as current tenants? (2) What level of scrutiny should be applied to the
rational basis test? In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission I1 Justice
Scalia argued for heightened scrutiny of land use regulation12-such
9. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), the Court stated that a zoning law
"effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. (citation omitted). In his dissent in Pennell
v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988), Justice Scalia agreed. With respect to rent controls, he
stated,
When excessive rents are forbidden, for example, landlords as a class become poorer and
tenants as a class ... become richer. Singling out landlords to be the transferrors may be
within our traditional constitutional notions of fairness, because they can plausibly be re-
garded as the source or the beneficiary of the high-rent problem.
Id. at 22.
10. The jurisdiction could also claim that the purpose of rent control is to provide insurance
against arbitrary rent increases. In this case, the rational basis test would most likely be satisfied.
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Id. at 833, 834-35 n.3.
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scrutiny might require an analysis of capitalization in the rent control
case, with evidence of complete capitalization being sufficient to invali-
date the regulation.
A more complete analysis of a particular rent control ordinance
would involve an analysis of the administration of the ordinance, along
with other policy concerns that affect the rental housing market. Thus,
one should ask whether the stringent limitations placed on tenants by the
ordinance are unfair in the sense that (a) they fail the rational basis test;
and (b) they fail the Agins test that regulation is a taking only if it "denies
an owner economically viable use" of his or her property.
1 3
How the Court would rule concerning a particular rent control ordi-
nance would be highly fact dependent. It is important to note here that
this substantive rule can be used to distinguish mobile home rent control
from traditional rent control. Mobile home rent control can be charac-
terized as unfair in not achieving its stated objectives, while other appro-
priately administered traditional rent control ordinances can be viewed
as being entirely consistent with their stated objectives. In either case,
the constitutionality of rent control depends on fairness, not on explicitly
stated efficiency concerns.
It is important to stress that, according to the rational basis test, the
constitutionality of rent control does depend crucially on the stated pur-
pose of the ordinance. If the goal of mobile home rent control was
clearly stated as eliminating the monopoly economic rent that would be
earned by the owner of the mobile home park when the monopoly right
to the park was granted, then the ordinance would clearly be valid. 14
Traditional rent control would, however, be unlikely to meet this goal,
unless it were put in place for a comparatively short period of time.
Suppose that mobile home rent control does pass a rational basis
test. Should the Court declare a regulatory taking, thereby making the
judgment that the ordinance unfairly places the burden of providing low
rents for current tenants on the single owner of a mobile home park? My
views on this subject have been developed elsewhere.' 5 Put briefly, I
would declare a regulatory taking only if there was good reason to be-
lieve that the adversely affected owner would have chosen to insure
against the risk of adverse government action had such insurance been
13. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
14. It is important, of course, that the Court be sensitized to efforts by the State to play with the
statement of regulatory purpose; the Court should be encouraged when appropriate to disavow such
strategic statements.
15. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings. An Economic Analysis,
72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984). See also Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The
Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984).
926 [Vol, 67:923
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available in the private market. The owners of mobile home parks would
not satisfy this criterion for compensation to the extent that: (a) they had
been (or should have been) aware of the possibility of rent control when
they built or purchased the mobile home park;' 6 and (b) they had suffi-
cient wealth to diversify the risk of rent control as part of a larger portfo-
lio of risky investments.
17
POSITIVE ASPECTS OF TAKINGS LAW
A reconsideration of the positive, legal framework of takings com-
pletes the commentary. Judge Kozinski based his decision in Hall on the
physical invasion test of Loretto v. Telepromter Manhattan CA TV Corp. 18
By giving a possessory interest to the owner of the coach, mobile home
rent control (according to Kozinski) had the effect of limiting the park
owner's ability to use the property and to transfer it to others. This limi-
tation on the ability to transfer property is argued by Judge Kozinski to
be a physical invasion.
Professor Fischel appears to accept the plausibility of Kozinski's ar-
gument without criticism. While a clever and intriguing argument, I be-
lieve that the physical invasion argument is neither compelling nor
dispositive. Faced with similar issues in Yee, 19 the Supreme Court did
not find the argument compelling enough to declare mobile home rent
control unconstitutional.
20
In terms of current takings doctrine, the physical invasion distinc-
tion is as clear as Professor Fischel's paper suggests. Fischel did not con-
sider the appropriateness of the physical invasion test in Hall-nor did
he point out that the Court has been backing away in recent years from
the physical invasion test suggested in Loretto.
21
16. If they were aware of the risk of imposition of rent controls they might have paid a reduced
price for the property.
17. I would provide a further test of the validity of rent control were a broader public policy
perspective taken. To the extent that rent control is sufficiently invasive that it creates substantial
interjurisdictional externalities, there is a strong public policy interest in restricting its use. This
federalist perspective is sketched out in Robert Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Federalist Fiscal
Constitution for an Imperfect World: Lessons from the United States, in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN
HISTORY, LAW, AND POLICY 76 (Harry Schieber ed., 1988).
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
20. The Court could have pursued a related line of thinking as spelled out in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church the Court stated that compensation is required when a temporary
regulation that severely limits the economic viability of the use of affected land is removed. Id. at
318-19. For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REV., 1600 (1988).
21. The discussion that follows is based on a perceptive analysis of current takings doctrine by
my colleague, Andrea Peterson. See Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underly-
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In Loretto the Court made it clear that only permanent physical in-
vasions were-per se unconstitutional. 22 The installation of cable TV facil-
ities on a landlord's apartment building was deemed to be such a
permanent invasion, primarily because of the nature of the invasion, not
the economic magnitude of the burden placed on the landlord. 23 Even if
one were to accept the Loretto view, it is not clear that mobile home rent
control should be deemed a permanent physical invasion; one can argue
that rent control does not "absolutely dispossess the owner of his rights
to use, and exclude others from, his property.
'24
More to the point, the Court has shown a reluctance to interpret the
permanent invasion test broadly. In Nollan25 the California Coastal
Commission had required the Nollan family to grant an easement al-
lowing the public to walk along the beach on their land in order to get
permission to build a house on the land.
In deciding Nollan, the Court stated that requiring access to a beach
is a permanent physical invasion, but the Court added that the provision
of access was conditional on the decision to build on the land. 26 On this
basis, the Court chose not to apply the permanent physical invasion rule
of Loretto. As Professor Peterson characterizes it,27 the Court found a
taking in Nollan because the Court did not find convincing the Coastal
Commission's argument that public beach access mitigated the harm of
construction to the public. 28 Consistent with my earlier takings perspec-
tive, the Court took a rational basis perspective, stating that the require-
ment of access to the beach did not "substantially advance legitimate
state interests. '
29
The Kozinski permanent physical invasion rent control test could
have provided a circuitous way to introduce economics explicitly into
takings law. It was my hope that the Court would have taken the direct
ing Principles: Part I - A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1333
(1989).
22. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 435 n. 12. If a temporary physical invasion were found, then under Loretto the Court
would apply a more complex balancing test given in Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124-28 (1978).
25. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
26. Id. at 832-34.
27. Peterson, supra note 21, at 1339.
28. Note, however, that the Court had rejected a similar argument in Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-
35. In Loretto there was a taking because the only alternative to a permanent physical invasion was
the destruction of the value of the rental property.
29. Id. at 434-42. Perhaps, as Professor Peterson points out, it would be more appropriate to
state that "the government was advancing this governmental interest by unfair means." Peterson,
supra note 21, at 1340. For a view that Nollan and Loretto are consistent, see Michelman, supra note
20, at 1608.
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route, by choosing to emphasize the economic aspects of the takings issue
explicitly-by spelling out an appropriate balancing test, which would
have included the payment of compensation when those harmed were
highly risk-averse individuals.
In Yee, 30 however, the Court chose neither, instead further elaborat-
ing on its earlier opinions that were based more on fairness than on effi-
ciency.31 The Court did, however, make it clear that they had not heard
enough to resolve the general issue of regulatory takings; this clearly
leaves open the possibility of a substantive treatment of the issue in the
near future.
32
30. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
31. Recall that Frank Michelman's demoralization cost analysis was viewed by him as a fair-
ness, not an efficiency argument. Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
32. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the Court made a small
move in this direction by ruling that a regulation which disallows the economic use of property
entirely is a compensable taking despite the fact that the regulation was designed to prevent public
harm.
1991]

